Editor's note: On April 11, 1986, two men on a crime spree were stopped by the FBI, but not before two agents were killed and five wounded in the shootout that followed. The lessons learned that day regarding officer safety, not least of which is the importance of a backup weapon, should not be forgotten.
In late 1985 and early 1986, two men in Miami, Fla., engaged in a crime spree, robbing banks, armored trucks and individual citizens. Their robberies often involved gunfire, and they wounded or killed several victims, proving that they were very dangerous.
These two men, Michael Platt and William Matix, met while serving in the military and had no prior criminal records. Matix had been a suspect in the death of his wife and a coworker in Ohio in 1983, but he had never been charged. The Miami FBI office worked for months following leads and trying unsuccessfully to identify the robbery suspects.
On April 11, 1986, eight FBI agents conducting surveillance of area banks attempted to initiate a high-risk traffic stop on Platt and Matix after observing them driving a black Monte Carlo, suspected of being stolen and used in the previous robberies. The heavily armed pair was driving through a low-traffic residential area of the then-unincorporated city of Pinecrest. Agents observed Platt loading a rifle in the front passenger seat but wanted to stop the pair before they returned to more densely populated areas. After a violent series of collisions with FBI vehicles, the Monte Carlo, driven by Matix, came to a stop in a small parking lot, surrounded by parked vehicles and FBI cars.
Matix fired a 12-gauge shotgun at agents, who returned fire, wounding him. Platt fired out the windows of the Monte Carlo with his Mini-14 semi-automatic rifle, wounding three agents before trying to exit the Monte Carlo. As Platt crawled out the passenger side window, Special Agent Jerry Dove shot Platt in the torso, causing an eventually fatal wound. Despite being mortally wounded, Platt used his Mini-14 with devastating effect as he rapidly and aggressively flanked and advanced on the agents while unleashing a steady barrage of .223 rounds at them. Platt killed Special Agents Dove and Ben Grogan and seriously wounded another agent before he and Matix attempted to leave in an FBI car.
Special Agent Edmundo Mireles, wounded by Platt at the outset, ended the fight by firing and cycling his pump shotgun one-handed, propped on a car bumper, and then by advancing on the suspects and emptying his .357 revolver into both of them. Platt and Matix were dead, but the FBI had paid a heavy price. Special Agents Ben Grogan and Jerry Dove were killed, and Special Agent Richard Manauzzi, Supervisory Special Agent Gordan McNeill, Special Agent Edmundo Mireles, Special Agent Gilbert Orrantia and Special Agent John Hanlon were wounded. Only Special Agent Ron Risner managed to escape injury.
The Response
Several changes were made by law enforcement nationwide in the wake of the Miami shootout. The FBI established the first ballistics testing protocol to determine the effectiveness of potential duty-rounds into ballistic gelatin through various mediums, including glass, sheet metal, sheet rock and clothing. The FBI's testing established that a bullet must penetrate between 12 and 18 inches into ballistic gelatin to ensure deep enough penetration to reach vital organs in human tissue, that duty ammunition should demonstrate consistent penetration in gelatin regardless of any medium in between, and that it should expand as much as possible.
Law enforcement's replacement of revolvers with semi-automatic pistols had been steadily growing but accelerated after this event. In addition, interest in larger caliber pistols grew, and 10 mm and .40-caliber cartridges were developed in response. The Miami shootout also gave a much-needed boost to officer survival training, including high-risk traffic stop tactics and firearms training. Many agencies added combat-style shooting courses that included such skills as one-handed shooting and weapon manipulation to replicate injured officer scenarios, such as those performed by at least three of the involved FBI agents.
Lessons Learned
Combat tactics: Standing still and shooting at a solid-color silhouette that doesn't move or shoot back doesn't prepare officers for life-and-death combat. Too many agencies only shoot static qualification courses. Shooting on the move, suppressive fire and team tactics must be practiced regularly in order to prevail in combat against aggressive and determined adversaries.
Rifles: Platt demonstrated the superior effectiveness of a semi-automatic rifle at distances where handguns had often been thought to be sufficient. Rifles provide greater accuracy, higher magazine capacity and greater terminal ballistic effects against human tissue. Rifles must be readily accessible in the passenger compartment instead of isolated in the trunk if they are to be deployed quickly enough to save lives.
Backup guns: Special Agent Dove was murdered trying desperately to get his pistol functioning again after it had been struck and rendered inoperable by one of Platt's .223 bullets. Two other agents involved in the shootout lost their primary handguns during the series of vehicle collisions. Both were subsequently wounded, but only one was carrying a backup revolver and could defend himself. Backup guns are vital, but some officers see them as an unnecessary expense and some departments don't allow them. If possible, a backup pistol should be able to utilize the full-size magazines from your duty pistol. And don't forget the importance of training with the backup pistol, to include accessing the gun with your non-dominant hand.
"Shot" doesn't mean dead: Platt and Matix were both shot numerous times, but they continued their aggressive actions. Dove's initial hit on Platt's torso was a fatal wound, but it took time for Platt to bleed out, time that allowed him to kill and wound multiple agents. In addition, Mireles ended the gun battle despite his own serious injuries. There are only three ways to stop a threat (or be stopped) during a shooting: the actor gives up, loses so much blood that he becomes incapable of continuing, or the actor's central nervous system is compromised, preventing further action. Note: Self-aid medical training and gear are essential for officers and can literally be the difference between life and death.
Three of the Below 100 tenets apply to this incident:
• Wear your vest: Only two of the agents involved were wearing issued soft body armor, despite the fact all the officers knew they were staking out two violent murderers. Although their soft body armor was ineffective against Platt's rifle, soft armor could protect from shotguns, handguns, indirect shots or shrapnel. Wear it at all times because there won't be time to retrieve it from the trunk once bullets start flying. Today, hard armor plates and carriers are readily available and recommended for high-risk arrests, such as this.
• WIN: What's important now is putting accurate and sustained fire on target, using cover and concealment, communicating with your fellow officers, moving aggressively and winning the fight.
• Remember… complacency kills! Assume that any arrest may turn into a fight for your life. If you have information the suspects may be heavily armed and/or violent, timing, location and resources are critical. Consider the use of additional resources, including SWAT.
References
Anderson W: French. Forensic Analysis of the April 11, 1986, FBI Firefight.
FBI: Shooting Incident, 4/11/86, Miami, FL, Part 1 of 4, www.webcitation.org/5gcuig4Jd, retrieved 01/09/2012.