Creating guiding principles through lessons learned in the fight against gangs & terror
Editor's Note: This article is the first of two in a series adapted from the author's longer works, "Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace" and "Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs." For a complete description of the principles and strategy described, visit the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board Executive website at www.iletsbei.com/forum.
It's hyperbole to claim that street gang members are domestic insurgents. Street gangs are not terror cells and street gang members are not insurgents. There are, however, distinct similarities between the two, including:
• Street gang members have the ability to easily blend into the population, making identification and apprehension difficult.
• Illegal and often violent activities hold the population they operate within "hostage."
• Street gangs are able to exist and operate based on how the community responds to them, be that support, coercion through fear or reprisal, or acquiescence.
• Street gangs and gang members make concerted efforts to recruit new members from the local community, including local schools.
• Acts of violence committed by street gang members are not limited to rival gang members or law enforcement but often include local community members.
• The existence of street gangs and their continued illegal and violent actions undermine the credibility of legitimate authority—law enforcement and civic government.
These similarities were noted by members of the military. In preparing for counterinsurgency operations, the military brought in several members of local law enforcement to both pick their brains and provide basic law enforcement training. Such training included street patrol tactics, conducting of vehicle stops, forensic investigations and the basic tenets of community policing.
Of particular interest is a study written in 2005 by Major Gary Calese, entitled "Law Enforcement Methods for Counterinsurgency Operations." Calese examined the similarities between insurgent groups and street gangs and outlined five shared characteristics: 1) leadership within the organization; 2) organizational structure; 3) culture within the organization; 4) recruitment; and 5) finances. He concluded by suggesting five concepts the Army should adopt from law enforcement for use against insurgent groups: 1) a "cultural shift" from killing the enemy to winning popular support in the local population; 2) the need to accurately determine the identity of insurgent members within the population; 3) a use of intelligence software to track insurgents and manage crime data; 4) a "community policing" style of operations aimed at working with local civic leaders; and 5) the development of "street knowledge"—learning the motivators and cultural mores for the local population.
The Army appeared to be either listening or thinking similarly, and in 2006 published FM-24, "Counterinsurgency." This new field manual describes a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, with emphasis on establishing host nation government legitimacy and working with and through locals to build trust and support, increasing security, providing service restoration, and effectively cutting off insurgents from local support. While the effectiveness of this strategy in war is likely to be debated for some time, for policing it provides what amounts to a well-tested application of community policing against violent groups—like street gangs. It's therefore in the interest of law enforcement to look at those competencies that were passed on the military and attempt to derive lessons from them to create a specific counter-gang strategy.
Background
The use of lessons learned for creating guiding principles is not new. In 1917, T.E. Lawrence—a.k.a., Lawrence of Arabia—wrote "Twenty-Seven Articles" describing the guiding principles needed for military advisors in Arab-populated regions to be successful. In 2006, Dr. David Kilcullen wrote "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," a modern rendition of Lawrence based upon his observations as a strategist and military leader in Iraq.
Using this template, what follows are the "19 Articles of Policing Criminal Street Gangs." These principles are created by combining what law enforcement already knows about policing street gangs with lessons learned from the adapted community policing and patrol tactics used in modern counterinsurgency warfare. As guiding principles, they should be considered criteria collectively required in order to have the best chance of strategic success.
The 19 Articles of Policing Criminal Street Gangs
First, do no harm. Do nothing to tarnish your integrity, your agency's integrity, or your profession's integrity. A reputation for justness will increase your legitimacy. Citizens are more likely to actively assist you by providing information if they know you will treat them and others fairly.
Know your turf. Know the local geography—physical and human.
Diagnose the problem. Determine the width and depth of the problem. Sit with your commanders and officers, solicit opinion, determine what has worked, and design operations. Work the problem as often as is necessary.
Organize for intelligence. Ensure that information is collected and shared by your street officers. Resist the temptation to leave intelligence gathering and distribution to units outside your command. Shape your operations around the intelligence you produce.
Organize for intra- and inter-agency operations. Meet regularly with your own people—as well as people from support units and outside agencies operating in your area—to share information and pool resources. Coordination of law enforcement operations with other civic service providers is also required.
Identify and build trust with local community advisors. Find trusted local people and include them in your operations. Incorporate their suggestions where possible. Win their public support and use it to collect more information.
Develop your field supervisors—then trust them. Set a standard, train to that standard, and hold your supervisors accountable to that standard. Empower supervisors with the authority to make critical tactical decisions.
Push operational decision-making down the chain. Requiring field commanders and supervisors to constantly seek approval up through the chain of command takes time, stifles creativity, and kills initiative. Developing field supervisors and granting them the authority to act is part of the solution. Organize your intelligence and operational efforts around your field units and allow them to make the operational decisions they need to make on a daily basis.
Rank is important—talent is more important. Capability is not granted by rank alone. Put the most capable people in the most appropriate spots, even if that means personnel report directly to persons two or three ranks ahead of them.
Stability in strategy; agility in operations. Set a strategic plan and goal and stick to it, but remain flexible in how you reach that goal. Build flexibility into the strategy so that you can adapt as situations require.
Avoid the vacuum. Removing gang leaders alone creates a power vacuum. Target and remove mid-level gang members with or before them. This prevents the power vacuum and the violence that often accompanies it.
Be there. There is no substitute for engagement. Do more than be seen: interact.
Prepare for your handover from Day One. Cultivate buy-in and ensure that any transition in command is as seamless as possible.
Maintain proactive patrolling. Supplement regular patrol presence with periods of heightened presence. Remain unpredictable and keep the initiative.
Be prepared for setbacks. Do not let setbacks convince you that your strategic plan has necessarily failed. Expect them; adapt through them.
Develop meaningful metrics and evaluate them regularly. Develop qualitative metrics and rate public perception of safety and law enforcement efficacy. When the perceptions of your officers and your trusted community advisors are aligned, then your qualitative data is meaningful and useful.
Keep local initiatives small. Part of your strategy should include programs that directly connect your officers with the community. Keep these programs or your involvement in them small and inexpensive—and, most importantly, sustainable. Create positive engagement that's built to last.
Put a premium on leadership. Develop your own leadership capabilities and the leadership capabilities of all of your field commanders, supervisors and officers.
Maintain the initiative. Develop adaptive strategies that evolve as the environment evolves. A constant, destabilizing series of law enforcement operations puts the street gang in a reactive posture. Inefficiency leads to chaos; chaos leads to collapse.
Conclusion
Population-centric counterinsurgency strategy closely resembles contemporary community policing efforts and provides law enforcement with the opportunity to look to counterinsurgency operations for lessons learned. The adaptation and application of these lessons learned, combined with what law enforcement already knows about policing criminal street gangs, allows for the creation of general principles for guiding operations against criminal street gangs. These principles must be used in total to provide the best opportunity for creating a successful counter-gang strategy. Each principle neglected decreases your chances for success.
In Part Two, we will discuss the roll of counter-gang efforts within community policing, re-define community policing, and outline the individual strategic elements of counter-gang strategy.