Officer Down: The Closed Door

The Sherry Lyons-Williams, T.J. Chambers Incident

• Brian McKenna
• Law Officer Volume 5 Issue 3
• 2009 Mar 1

Editor's note: This article appeared in part in the March issue of Law Officer Magazine. For additional discussion and training value, a full analysis of the incident is provided here.

The Incident
Investigators T.J. Chambers and Sherry Lyons-Williams had become close friends while working together on an undercover narcotics unit for six-and-a-half years. Chambers, at age 35, was four years younger than Lyons-Williams, but had a little more time on the job, with 15 years in contrast to Lyons-Williams' 13 years. Their friendship was built on a mutual respect for one another's dedication, solid work ethic and enthusiasm for taking dealers off the street. As part of a six-officer unit who had trained and worked together as team, they knew their individual roles in the drug raid they were about to initiate. 

Chambers would go in first, as soon as the door was breached, followed by two other officers and then Lyons-Williams. After entering, they would clear each room and secure any suspects inside, moving rapidly but with a methodical fluidity gained from years of conducting drug raids as a team.

The man they were after was a dealer in his mid 30s named Michael Thompson, who, despite his propensity for dealing drugs, had a remarkably clean record of only one misdemeanor arrest for trespassing. A confidential informant (CI) had made several buys from him over the past few months, and the team had obtained a search warrant for his residence earlier that day. After the CI made another buy to confirm that Thompson was still dealing from the residence, they had met with two uniformed officers to coordinate the raid, and then driven to the house. After the patrol officers took up their prearranged positions at two corners of the building, the undercover officers, clad in raid uniforms with distinctive markings identifying them as police officers, had climbed out of their van and moved up to the front door.

It was a pleasant spring afternoon; sunny but absent the sweltering heat that would come with the approaching summer. Spring provided ideal weather conditions for drug raids—not too cold but cool enough to keep the ballistic helmets and soft body armor they habitually wore from becoming uncomfortably hot. The helmets and concealable vests were optional department-issued equipment for all five of the city's narcotics units, but every member of this team wore them during raids at the insistence of their sergeant. Thompson wasn't reported to be armed or known to be violent, but all drug raids entail considerable risk, and the sergeant understood the value of being prepared.

Everything seemed to be proceeding normally as the breaching officer cut through the heavily barred outer door. After the knock and announcement, followed by the required pause, a single blow from the sledgehammer sprang the inner door open. Chambers was the first to enter, moving smoothly through the doorway into the darkened interior. The others followed and began their systematic search, expecting to find Thompson in one of the back rooms, per the information provided by the CI. Chambers was surprised to see that the residence had been converted into a boarding house, but everything else seemed to be going according to plan.

As the investigators moved toward the back rooms, Chambers heard the voice of one of the officers outside on the radio. "A male subject just came out the back door from the basement," the officer reported, "but he ran back inside and locked the door when he saw me."

The door leading down to the basement was only a few feet away, so Chambers pulled it open and headed down the stairs. He had just reached the bottom of the staircase when he saw a man, later identified as Thompson, duck into a door at the far end of the basement's narrow, dimly lit hallway and slam the door shut behind him.

Chambers wasn't far behind. Suspecting that Thompson was going to flush his dope, he tried the doorknob. As expected, it was locked. Backing off just a short distance, Chambers raised his left leg and drove a powerful kick into the door just below the knob. The flimsy lock gave way, and the door flew open.

Chambers knew that anything can happen when a door is kicked in, but nothing could have prepared him for the hell that brook loose at that instant. Explosions of white hot light erupted from the gloom just inside the door. Thompson was there, not more than four feet away, spewing lead at him from the muzzle of a .45 autoloader.

Although caught off guard by the abruptness and intensity of the attack, Chambers had already drawn his gun, an S&W Model 6903 9 mm, and was holding it at the low ready. Chambers says the scene before him went silent and shifted into slow motion. He whipped his gun up into firing position and returned fire, sending a stream of gunfire into his adversary's center mass. Confident that he was getting hits, but seeing no reaction from Thompson, Chambers charged forward, gun still blazing. At the same time, he went for Thompson's gun. His left hand crashed into the deadly .45, knocking Thompson's hand to his left, where the pistol discharged twice, sending both slugs harmlessly into the adjacent wall next to them.

Chambers kept shooting, but then his slide locked back. Thompson was still on his feet and—although Chambers had knocked the .45 out of the way for now—he was still armed. Chambers knew the gunshots would bring his fellow officers rushing to his aid, and he was afraid of what might happen if Thompson got past him and a gun battle ensued. In addition to the danger from Thompson's gunfire, everyone would be at great risk from friendly fire in the close confines of the basement. Chambers was determined not to let that happen.
Chambers' present circumstances ruled out reloading, so he grabbed Thompson, took a step backward and pulled the man hard toward him. Chambers stumbled backward, but held on, dragging Thompson down on top of him. Thompson wasn't moving, so Chambers shifted his body to the right and shoved Thompson over to the left, causing the man to roll off him and thud to the floor. Looking into the man's face, Chambers confirmed what his senses had already told him: Thompson was dead. All 13 of Chambers' rounds had found their mark; about half of them had struck Thompson in the lower stomach and the other half squarely in the chest.
Thompson was no longer a threat, but Chambers didn't know if there was anyone else in the room. He started to get to his feet so he could finish clearing the room, but he couldn't move his left leg. He looked down at the useless limb, and saw blood and a hole in the left knee of his uniform pants. With the knowledge that his mobility was seriously limited came the realization that he had become a sitting duck. Now focusing on the need to stay alert for new threats, he began to scan his surroundings. It was then that he looked over his shoulder and saw that he had not been alone; Sherry Lyons-Williams was lying silent and motionless on the floor of the hallway about five feet behind him.

Within seconds, Chambers was surrounded by his fellow team members. One of them helped him to his feet and escorted him outside while another secured Thompson and the rest began to work on Lyons-Williams. As the minutes passed, Chambers discovered that he had also been shot in the face and right shoulder, but neither injury was particularly severe, and he was still conscious and alert. His gravest concern was for Lyons-Williams. His worst fears were soon realized. Despite the efforts of the officers on scene, she died while en route to the hospital.

The Aftermath
Thompson was dead on scene from multiple gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen. Heroin, crack and another handgun were found in his room, and the buy money was in one of his pockets. When his pistol was examined later, investigators found that seven of its eight rounds had been fired. Of the seven spent rounds, two went into the wall, one was stopped by Chambers' vest (he didn't know it until later, but one bullet had hit his vest near his heart), and three struck Chambers: one in the face, one in the shoulder and the third in his knee. That leaves only one spent round that didn't strike either Chambers or the wall. But Lyons-Williams was struck three times, which means that at least two of the bullets that wounded Chambers also struck her. One round inflicted a non-fatal wound to her hip, but the other two shots were fatal, and to further add to this tragedy, both bullets barely missed her ballistic protection. One scarcely missed her helmet and struck her in the head, and the other passed between the side panels of her vest before penetrating her side and piercing her heart.

Remarkably, the wound to Chambers' face was a relatively minor one. After entering his right cheek about two inches below the eye, it exited his neck just below his right ear without causing any serious damage. The wound to his right shoulder was also relatively minor, having entered the front of the shoulder and exited the back without striking any internal organs, major blood vessels or bone. The wound to his left knee was the most serious. After shattering several knee bones, the bullet had traveled about half way up his leg and exited the front of his thigh. It had done considerable damage, but he was able to return to full duty after seven months of rehabilitation, including several surgeries. He is still with the same department, and now serves in its detective division. 

Discussion & Analysis
This incident was one of those rare cases in which an officer's murder can be attributed almost exclusively to misfortune. Had it not been for a tragic twist of fate, it is very likely that Chambers' aggressive and well-executed counterattack would have stopped the threat without serious injury to Lyons-Williams.
Nevertheless, much can be learned from this tragedy. An in-depth analysis of this case reveals many crucial lessons related to officer safety, including risk assessment, door entry and foot pursuit tactics, close-range use of the handgun, the effectiveness of gunfire, the importance of training, awareness of sensory distortions and winning mindset. These lifesaving lessons were purchased with the blood of two fine officers, one of whom paid the ultimate price. We owe it to them to learn as much as we can from their sacrifice. 
First, review the discussion questions below and work through your own answers.

Discussion Questions

1. Most officers readily kick doors open when necessary to apprehend fleeing suspects. Under what circumstances is it worth the risk to do so? What factors should be weighed when making that decision?
2. What additional hazards are involved in kicking a door when the area in front of it is a closely confined, like in a narrow hallway? How can these dangers be reduced?
3. How risky are foot pursuits? Discuss the hazards associated with them, and how to deal with them.
   What is the best way to counter a sudden close-range armed attack like the one Thompson used against Investigator Chambers?
4. How can we prepare for the possibility that our gunfire may not stop an opponent immediately? What should our attitude be if we are hit by gunfire?
5. What sensory distortions did Investigator Chambers experience during the shooting? How important is it to be aware of the various sensory distortions that may occur during a deadly force incident? Why?
6. What can this case teach us about how to win in the face of a seemingly hopeless situation, like the one faced by Investigator Chambers?
7. In what ways did Investigator Chambers' attitude and actions exemplify winning mindset and warrior spirit?  

Risk Assessment
Unfortunately, there were no specific danger signs prior to Thompson's attack to indicate that he might be dangerous. His only prior arrest was for trespassing, and there was no intelligence available to indicate that he was armed or capable of lethal violence. On the other hand, the situation itself entailed rather significant risks irrespective of Thompson's criminal history or past behavior. Both narcotics raids and door entries always entail increased risks, but this situation was made more dangerous by the narrow hallway outside the bedroom door. With no cover on either side of the door, the officers were fixed in a spot directly in Thompson's line of fire as Chambers kicked the door in.

What options does an officer have when a closed door stands between him and his suspect during a foot pursuit? As with any other hazard, he has to weigh the need for immediate action against the risks involved. If the officer is confined to a space directly in front of the door (as in this case) and the suspect is believed to be armed, entry should not be attempted unless necessary to preserve innocent lives. At the other end of the spectrum is a pursuit for a minor, nonviolent offense with a low probability of any weapons being involved, plenty of room to maneuver outside the door and enough time to make a well-planned entry.
But the decision is seldom that easy. In this case, for example, most officers would probably have chosen to kick the door to prevent Thompson from disposing of any drugs in his possession. This is because police officers tend to be dedicated, task-oriented individuals who, despite the well-known hazards of the job, seldom encounter serious violence directed against them. Because most people who resist do nothing more than try to break free and/or flee, we tend to become desensitized to the rare, though very real possibility of meeting lethal resistance. This is especially true when, as in this case, there is nothing specific to indicate that the suspect may be dangerous.

A key to avoiding this problem is to always put safety first. This is not meant to imply that we should be any less aggressive about enforcing the law, but we should never let our enthusiasm dictate our actions. Rather, we need to approach every call, every encounter with the question: "What is there about this situation that makes me vulnerable, and what can I do about it?" Then, when we detect anything that increases our vulnerability, we need to compensate by changing our tactics and/or approach. It isn't always possible or even desirable to make any drastic tactical changes, but we can at least raise our awareness and start planning a response in case something goes wrong.

If done consistently over time, this will become a habit that not only makes you more alert to danger, but also helps crowd out anger, the urge to rush ahead, and other thoughts and emotions that can lead to dangerous decisions. With commitment and a little effort, safety awareness can eventually become an integral part of everything you do.

With regard to the decision to kick a door, it is important to keep in mind that proper threat assessment in such situations is likely to be hampered by the fact that it is often necessary to weigh several critical factors very quickly, many of which are hard to accurately discern. Example: What does the officer know about the suspect and his history? Is the suspect known or likely to be armed? Are there any weapons in the room? Is the suspect just trying to escape or dispose of evidence, or is he likely to be planning an attack? Is there a safer way to enter the room? If so, how long will it take? Considering the time pressures involved and large number of questions to be answered when making such a decision, it is best to set some guidelines beforehand. All officers should give a lot of thought to the circumstances under which they will or will not kick doors in, but this is especially true for officers in narcotics and other units that more frequently encounter suspects hiding behind secured doors. Officers in these units should also consider developing unit guidelines regarding this issue so that all members of the team can agree beforehand on the risks they are willing to take and then work toward a common objective when the situation arises. No guidelines can cover every possibility, of course, but general guidelines for common situations will help officers make the best possible decisions when time is short.

It is also important to consider the various resources that are available to officers when setting these guidelines. For example, some agencies make it a policy to use tactical teams for all drug raids because of the risks involved. This is the safest approach, but many departments don't have that luxury. In that case, a good alternative is to train the narcotics team in SWAT tactics for entering and clearing buildings, and then properly equip them for the proper application of those tactics.1

Door Entries & Narrow Hallways
Regardless of how well trained and equipped officers may be, there is no way to breach a door at the end of a narrow hallway or similar confined space without leaving them dangerously exposed to gunfire from within. Because there is nowhere to go for cover, it is usually best for the breaching and cover officers to stand next to one another with guns drawn at the low ready. Although this puts both officers dangerously close to any armed assailant who may be waiting inside, it has the advantage of splitting them up to some extent, thereby avoiding the tragedy of one officer being hit by bullets aimed at the other, as happened in this case. It also forces the suspect to change his point of aim, even if only slightly, in order to hit both officers; compels him to focus on two equally dangerous threats simultaneously (something that is psychologically difficult to do); and doubles the officers' firepower by giving them both a clear field of fire without concern about friendly fire threats. If the officers are wearing body armor and are squarely facing the doorway, they will also be afforded the best possible coverage from their vests, which will reduce the likelihood of an incoming round striking them between the side panels, as happened in this case.

Ideally, a tactical team, or at least well-trained officers who are equipped with full-torso tactical armor, ballistic helmets and shields, should be used to breach all doors, and/or entry should be made via another point, preferably after a distraction has been created. However, this is often impractical, especially when it is important to make the entry quickly. In such cases, two officers standing side-by-side is usually the safest alternative. 

In many cases, this tactic can be made more effective by throwing a light stick through the doorway as soon as the door is kicked in (make sure to activate the stick before kicking the door). This creates a relatively minor, yet very effective distraction that disrupts the thought processes of anyone inside the room, including any armed assailant who may be waiting behind the door. In addition, because the eyes naturally follow any item that comes across their field of view, the sudden moving light will almost certainly cause anyone inside to take their eyes off the door. Although this will not necessarily cause the attacker to withhold fire, it is very likely to throw his aim off and/or cause him to hesitate. Light sticks are inexpensive, lightweight and small enough to be carried at all times. In addition, the stick doesn't have to be aimed at any particular spot in the room. In fact, it may be even more distracting if it bounces off the door, a wall or even the suspect as it flies into the room. With a little practice, the timing of the throw can be coordinated with the kick so that both happen almost simultaneously for maximum effectiveness. As with any door-entry tactic, it is preferable to use two officers for this tactic, but it can be used by single officer, if necessary, as long as he pauses long enough to plan out his timing beforehand. In either case, it is best if the officer(s) have been trained beforehand.

Another consideration when kicking a door is the kind of kick to use. While most officers use a forward kick, there are good arguments to be made for using a "mule kick" instead. Mule kicks are more powerful, and will breach most doors on the first kick, thereby significantly reducing the possibility of having to telegraph the entry by kicking the door more than once. Because it is necessary to bend forward at the waist when applying mule kicks, they also lower the breaching officer's profile, thus making him a smaller target. Finally, the breaching officer's lower profile also reduces his chances of being struck by friendly fire from his cover officer(s). This is especially important when, due to a confined space outside the door, officers are crowded together and the breaching officer has nowhere to go to avoid friendly fire. In some cases, it may even be advisable for the breaching officer to plan to drop to the floor in the event of a shooting. That way, he won't have to stop to consider his options if it happens.

The mule kick makes some officers uncomfortable, because they have to turn their backs to the door to deliver it, thereby slowing them down when making entry or returning fire. With practice, however, most officers find that they can return fire and/or enter a room just as quickly and effectively after delivering a mule kick as they can after using a front kick.

Foot Pursuits
Although the main focus of this analysis so far has been on door entries, it is useful to note that this incident occurred during what was essentially a foot pursuit. Although Chambers wasn't actually chasing Thompson down the hallway, he was attempting to apprehend him, and the circumstances entailed many of the tactical concerns associated with foot pursuits.

As with any foot pursuit, Chambers had to deal with some critical unknowns. Besides being unfamiliar with his surroundings and the hazards they contained, he had no way of knowing Thompson's next move or intentions. In addition, the danger increased after he lost sight of his quarry. The greatest danger in any foot pursuit is the fact that we must always be entering areas under the suspect's control, especially any time the suspect disappears from view. As we penetrate deeper into the unknown, he is always one step ahead of us, and there is no way of knowing whether he plans to keep running, hide somewhere or stop to ambush us (which is, of course, what Thompson did after he entered the bedroom and closed the door behind him).

It is important for all officers to fully understand these hazards and gauge their actions accordingly. Although it is beyond the scope of this analysis to discuss foot pursuit tactics in detail, there are some important safety measures that should be mentioned here. These include making wide turns when running around corners; using available concealment and cover when possible; keeping the dispatcher advised of your location; remaining alert for potential environmental hazards (fences, ditches, clothes lines, etc.); anticipating danger when entering dark areas, rounding corners, going through doorways, etc.; and pausing when necessary to plan your next move. It is also important to keep your ears open for sounds that disclose the suspect's actions, like running footsteps, jingling fences, rustling brush, barking dogs or—most importantly—the sudden cessation of any of these. Finally, and probably most important of all, it is essential to know when to stop. Officers often persist in chasing suspects long after it remains safe to do so or there is any real hope of catching them, and we must be ready and willing to recognize when that time has come. 

Unfortunately, it appears that despite the obvious hazards involved, few officers are adequately trained in foot pursuit tactics. The FBI's excellent study on violence against police officers,  Violent Encounters: A Study of Felonious Assaults on Our Nation's Law Enforcement Officers, noted that 14 percent of the incidents studied occurred during foot pursuits, but only 20 percent of the officers in the study had received any training in foot pursuit tactics, with an average of only two hours of training per officer.2 Considering the substantial risks involved, it is surprising that so little attention is given to training our nation's police officers in foot pursuit tactics. Those of us who are trainers need to address this problem by developing practical foot pursuit tactics and finding the best methods for teaching them.

Close-Quarters Use of the Handgun
Despite the fact that Chambers had never been trained in close-quarters use of handguns, his response to Thompson's attack was remarkably well conceived and equally well executed. Braving Thompson's merciless hail of close-range gunfire as the door flew open, he immediately and aggressively counterattacked with hard-hitting return fire as he moved forward and attacked Thompson's weapon. Knocking the gun away was especially remarkable, not only because it displayed impressive aggressiveness, but also because, in spite of being conceived under the stress of sudden combat, it was the most effective way to counter the threat. Such clear thinking and mental flexibility are very difficult to achieve under extreme stress, and it is to Chambers' credit that he was able to respond as effectively as he did under the circumstances.

As important as it is to return fire during a close-range attack, it isn't always enough, especially when there is no cover available. Even highly accurate shots to center mass will not guarantee immediate termination of the threat, so it is important to take action against the weapon itself. As you return fire, charge forward into your assailant and attack his weapon. Grab it if you can, but your primary goal is to get out of the line of fire, so knocking it off to one side will get the job done. If you can, move diagonally into your assailant so you will be off to one side as you crash into him. This will make it even harder for him to move his gun into position to shoot you. Drive hard into him to throw him off balance, keep moving as long as you can, and keep shooting until he ceases to be a threat. Remember, the idea is not only to get out of his line of fire, but to definitively stop him before he can take any further aggressive action against you.

Unlike this case, most close-range armed attacks don't come from assailants who already have their guns drawn and pointed at the officer. More likely, the assailant will have to draw first, but that gives you a little more time to react and the countermeasures are the same: Charge into your attacker as you attack his weapon, and simultaneously counterattack. If you haven't drawn your gun yet, you will have to draw it as you move, but that won't be a problem if you have developed a smooth, reasonably quick draw. 

These techniques sound rather complicated, but the actions required are relatively gross motor skills that flow together well. The only skill that requires much fine motor coordination is drawing the weapon, and most officers practice their draw so often that it becomes a conditioned response. In addition, these techniques have the distinct advantage of being forgiving. For example, when attacking the weapon, it is not essential to grab or strike the weapon or even the hand holding it. Even an indirect blow to your assailant's forearm that brushes the weapon aside will make it harder for him to shoot accurately, while buying you precious time to move in and counterattack. The idea is to knock him off balance mentally—and physically when possible—with an unexpected counterattack that instantly shifts the tactical advantage to you.

This is not to imply that these techniques are so simple that they don't need to be practiced. Like any technique, they should be practiced on a regular basis to maximize their effectiveness. Officers should be drilled in them often, preferably in dynamic, realistic one-on-one exercises like those used for dynamic control tactics training. Because accuracy is not critical and the risk of injury from Simunitions or AirSoft weapons is too great at contact range, it is not necessary, or even advisable, to use anything other than non-functioning training guns. The key is to focus on developing proficiency in attacking the weapon, driving forward into the assailant and getting the gun on target rather than pinpoint accuracy.

Acting with exemplary clarity of thought, mental flexibility and courage, Chambers launched an incredibly swift and effective counterattack in the face of grave danger. Had it not been for Lyons-Williams' ill-fated position behind him, his actions would have saved her life as well as his own.

Resilience to Gunfire
Thompson took 13 bullets to center mass, but he still managed to fire seven rounds before Chambers dragged him to the ground. And Chambers wasn't even aware of his wounds, one of which was from a .45 caliber slug to the face, until after the fight. This case and many others like it demonstrate how resilient human beings can be to bullet wounds. 

Although firearms remain the most effective way to quickly stop an aggressive armed assailant, they are not 100 percent reliable. We must recognize that even multiple hits to vital areas may not incapacitate an assailant as quickly as expected, and be ready to respond accordingly. Become as proficient as possible with your firearm so you can make every shot count, but also be prepared to keep shooting until your attacker is no longer a threat, knock his gun aside like Chambers did, crush his throat with your empty gun, stab him through an eye with your pen or whatever else it takes to stop the fight.

Also remember that you are equally resilient to gunfire. Far less than 10 percent of all gunshot wounds inflict mortal injuries, and most of those kill instantaneously, so the odds are excellent that you will survive if you are still alive after being hit. This is true even for head wounds, as evidenced by the fact that Chambers suffered no serious injuries from the round to his face and didn't even realize he had been wounded there until several minutes after the shooting. The face and skull are made up of hard, curved bones that are more resistant to bullets than most of the other bones in the body, and the most vulnerable parts of the head are very small targets. In fact, it is not at all uncommon for people to survive head wounds, often with little or no long-term impairment.

Human beings can overcome far more punishment than most of us realize, especially if they are determined to persevere and believe in their ability to heal. Besides, worrying will only distract you from the only thing that really counts—winning the fight. Ignore your injuries, stay focused on winning, and keep going no matter what. 

Body Armor
If Chambers had not been wearing body armor, the slug to his chest might well have killed him, or if not, it probably would have incapacitated him or inhibited his ability to continue his highly effective counterattack. If Thompson had been allowed to fire his last three rounds unhindered by Chambers' actions (i.e., the two that went into the wall and the one that remained unfired), it is likely that one or more of them would have struck Chambers with fatal or debilitating results. Once again, body armor proved its worth, not only by preventing a potentially fatal wound, but also by allowing a determined officer to stay in the fight.

It is interesting to note that although Chambers' department did not require its narcotics officers to wear their department-issued body armor, his supervisor did require that it be worn on all drug raids. This fact highlights the crucial role that supervisors play in officer safety. They set the tone for their units and have a major impact on how their officers think and behave. By making officer safety a top priority, insisting that their officers practice good safety habits and requiring that they use the safety equipment available to them, they can save lives. What is more important than that?

Unfortunately, ill fortune befell Lyons-Williams with regard to the armor she wore. She was hit in the head by a bullet that missed her helmet, and the mortal wound to her torso went between the side panels of her concealable vest. Although her head wound was also fatal, that doesn't change the fact that her body armor failed to provide adequate coverage. Officers who regularly engage in high-risk activities and who, like narcotics officers, have the opportunity to adequately equip themselves for those activities beforehand, should be equipped with the best ballistic protection available, including full-torso tactical body armor. Consideration should also be given to issuing them ballistic shields and training them in their use.

It is important to note that fatal wounds from bullets that enter between the side panels of ballistic vests or under the armpit are not unusual. Because it would be impractical for most officers to wear full tactical body armor on a regular basis, another alternative is to maximize the protection afforded by concealable armor through proper body positioning. This can best be achieved by using a shooting stance that presents the front, rather than the side of the officer's torso to his assailant, which is a major advantage of the Isosceles over the Weaver Stance. Many officers and trainers prefer the Weaver, of course, and the value of using a stance that fits your individual characteristics and enhances your self confidence should not be minimized, but it is also very important to put as much bullet resistant material between you and your assailant as possible. Every officer should be encouraged to adapt a solid shooting stance that comes as close to the Isosceles as his individual body characteristics will allow.

Training Issues
Chambers trained extensively with firearms, both with his narcotics unit and on his own at a personal range, and it paid off. While under a sudden hail of gunfire, he was able to hit his assailant in the torso with every one of the 13 rounds he fired. While it is true that the close range made it easier to get hits, everything else was working against him. Essentially, he was ambushed at very close range, caught out in the open with nowhere to go for cover and took hits before he could return fire. It is not at all unusual to miss at close range, especially when the attack comes so suddenly, but he made a solid hit with every pull of the trigger. In addition, he was able to adapt to the circumstances by charging Thompson and knocking his gun aside while returning fire.

Good training is vital to this kind of commendable performance under intense stress. Besides developing the skills needed to effectively counter threats—in this case exemplary gun handling and marksmanship—training also instills the self-confidence that is so crucial to winning. 

Doubt magnifies fear, which can lead to dangerously inappropriate reactions in the face of danger, like hesitation, freezing up, ill-conceived countermeasures, etc., but self-confidence conquers doubt and calms fear. An officer who possesses it can face danger with the assurance that he can win, which reduces stress, clarifies thinking, enhances decision making and creates a winning attitude. Very likely, it was this kind of belief in himself and his capacity to defeat Thompson's attack, based upon his training and fighting spirit, that enabled Chambers to counter Thompson's resistance to his gunfire by attacking his weapon and dragging him to the floor.

Sensory Distortions
Chambers experienced the shooting in slow motion and complete silence. Both of these sensory distortions often occur in lethal encounters, as do many others, including fast motion, intensified sounds, selective exclusion of certain sounds (most commonly gunshots), perception of distances as being closer than they are, heightened attention to certain details, tunnel vision, etc.

It is important for officers to be aware of these phenomena for various reasons. First and foremost, it can be important to their safety. Sensory distortions can be very distracting and/or confusing if they happen unexpectedly in the middle of a gunfight, which can shift the officer's attention away from the vital task of stopping the threat. By preparing officers to expect these distortions, awareness can alleviate or even eliminate their effect on an officer's focus and performance.

Awareness can also play a significant role in an officer's emotional recovery in the aftermath of a lethal confrontation. In some cases, sensory distortions can appear to be so extraordinary that officers begin to doubt their mental stability. When added to the self-doubt and self-criticism that often occur after a deadly force incident, this kind of thinking can be detrimental to the recovery process. Awareness of the various distortions that may occur will virtually eliminate the possibility of this happening. 

Lastly, awareness can have a significant impact on an officer's legal survival. Unless the officer is aware of these phenomena and understands their potential impact on his recall of high-stress events, he may unintentionally make statements to investigators that—although he honestly believes them to be true—conflict with the actual evidence. Once made, such statements are hard to recant without appearing to be dishonest. The best way for officers to alleviate this problem is to avoid giving statements that include unnecessary details about things they may have misconstrued under stress. While it is important to give an accurate statement that demonstrates why you believed deadly force was necessary, it is unwise to include details that may later prove to be erroneous. Officers who understand perceptual distortions are more likely to know how to give an appropriate statement without saying too much. In addition, a prepared officer can explain this to investigators should they press for unnecessary details during his initial statement.

Firearms Discipline
Little is known about exactly how Lyons-Williams lost her life, except to say that she died in a valiant effort to back up her partner. We also know that she did not discharge her weapon, and this is significant because of the fact that Chambers was in her line of fire. While it is possible that she didn't have time to shoot before she was fatally wounded, it is also quite possible that she withheld fire for fear of striking her partner. If so, she displayed notable firearms discipline and a lot of character by doing so in spite of the mortal danger confronting her. Considering the kind of officer she was, this is a very good possibility. 

Winning Mindset
Chambers displayed many of the traits that are common among officers who are able to win in spite of the odds against them. First, he demonstrated mental flexibility by attacking Thompson's gun and then pulling him to the floor when his return fire failed to immediately achieve its desired results. Winners don't give up or become discouraged. Instead, they brush aside setbacks and find another way to get the job done.
An essential key to achieving mental flexibility is proper focus. Winners focus on only one thing—winning. They ignore pain, wounds, fear and anything else that might detract from that goal, and they keep pushing forward until they reach it. Chambers demonstrated this trait not only in the way he pressed his attack against Thompson, but also in the way he continued to stay focused after Thompson was down. First, he attempted to clear the room. Then, after discovering that his knee wound prohibited from achieving that goal, he refused to dwell on the injury and focused instead on scanning the area for additional threats. This is the kind of focus that wins fights.

Finally, Chambers possessed the trait that sets warriors apart from all others—selflessness. Even when under a blistering barrage of gunfire at pointblank range, he was determined not to allow Thompson to get past him. He knew the rest of his team would be rushing to the sound of the gunfire, and he realized the ensuing gun battle would probably occur in the hallway, where the risk from friendly fire would be at least as great as the danger posed by Thompson himself. That was unthinkable to a man like Chambers, and it drove him to do whatever it took to keep it from happening, regardless of the risk to his own safety. This commitment to others above self is what most distinguishes Chambers as a true warrior. It should serve as an inspiring example to us all.

Summary

• Always put safety first.
• Consider setting guidelines regarding when to kick a door and when not to.
  Given the serious hazards associated with kicking doors when the area in front of them is a closely confined space like a narrow hallway, it is important to develop tactics for handling them more safely.
  Foot pursuits are a high-risk activity. It is essential to understand the hazards they entail, and to gauge your actions accordingly.
• When attacked with a deadly weapon at close range, charge forward into your attacker while attacking his weapon and aggressively applying deadly force.
• Gunfire may not stop an assailant immediately. Keep shooting until the threat is terminated, and do whatever else it takes to win.
• Gunshot wounds, including those to the head, are seldom fatal. If you are shot, remember that you can still win.
• Always wear body armor.
• Besides developing the skills needed to effectively counter threats, training also instills the self-confidence needed to win. Train often and train hard.
• Be aware of the sensory distortions that are common to lethal encounters so they will not distract you when they occur.
• When under attack, stay focused on winning, regardless how bad things may appear to be. Keep fighting, no matter what. 

Brian McKenna is a retired lieutenant from the Hazelwood (MO) Police Department, where he served in patrol, traffic, mobile reserve and training. He is a 32-year police veteran, with a strong background in police training at both the recruit and in-service levels, and served his department as lead firearms instructor as well as in various other training functions. He is a state certified police instructor, and holds a Master's degree in human resource development. Brian is a member of ILEETA and IALEFI, writes extensively on officer safety topics, and trains police officers nationwide in mental preparation for armed encounters and other topic related to officer safety. He has recently completed a book of incidents from his Officer Down column, which is expected to be available this winter. Contact him at  pmbrianod@charter.net or visit his Web site at  www.winningedgetraining.com .

Tell Us About It!
Law Officer intends to run an "Officer Down" article by Brian McKenna every few months. In order to obtain incidents that provide clear and relevant case studies, we would like to draw from our largest available resource—you, the reader. If you have, or can obtain, factual information on actual incidents you think we can use, contact McKenna by mail at 7412 Lynn Grove Ct., Hazelwood, MO 63042,  via e-mail at  pmbrianod@charter.net or by telephone phone at 314/921-6977 (call collect) or mobile phone at 314/941-2651.

Notes

1. In this case, the officers received a considerable amount of tactical training, and were equipped with ballistic helmets and concealable soft body armor, but not full-torso tactical armor or ballistic shields. If they had been so equipped, it is likely that Lyons-Williams would not have been killed. To the department's credit, its administration acknowledged this problem and issued narcotics officers tactical armor shortly after Lyons-Williams' death.
2. FBI (2006). Violent encounters: A study of felonious assaults on our nation's law enforcement officers. Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Justice. Pp. 9, 15 and 122. 

Author's Note
The author would like to thank the following individuals for their gracious assistance with the analysis of this incident: Captain Steven Buckley, SWAT commander, Berkeley (Mo.) Police Department; and Lt. Dale McKenna (ret.), former SWAT commander and chief of patrol, Morgan County (Ill.) Sheriff's Department.

• Large-format diagram of incident (PDF document)

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• Law Officer Magazine Volume 5 Issue 3

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